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THE TRIBE, THE EMPIRE, AND THE NATION:
ENFORCEABILITY OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY TREATIES WITH
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES*
Adam F. Kinneyt
If there fall out any wars between us and them, what their fight is likely to
be, we having advantages against them so many manner of ways, as by our
discipline, our strange weapons and devices else, especially by ordinance
great and small, it may easily be imagined, by the experience we have had
in some places, the turning up of their heels against us in running away
was their best defence.
-Thomas Harriot, 15881
Thomas Harriot's insightfulness in the late sixteenth century carried
a prophetic chill as, despite the Natives' flight, the Western Age of Explora-
tion precipitated the virtual destruction of various Native American cultures
that had flourished in North America for millennia.2 Although many lament
this loss, current attitudes concerning the rights and powers of Native Amer-
ican tribes in the United States betray the same base self-interest of our co-
lonial forefathers. These attitudes of passive sympathy came to the forefront
in a recent series of decisions concerning the construction of a new reservoir
on the Mattaponi River in southeastern Virginia. The Mattaponi tribe, a
remnant of the once great Powhatan Confederacy, alleges that the construc-
tion of this reservoir-which, due to rapid population growth, is becoming a
necessity for Virginia-infringes upon rights guaranteed in the 1677 Treaty
of Middle Plantation.3 The Mattaponi case is complex, presenting a number
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THOMAS HARROT, THE INDIAN METHOD OF WARFARE (1588), reprinted in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN COLONIAL HISTORY: DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS, 13 (Karen Ordahl
Kupperman ed., Lexington, 1993).
2 RICHARD MIDDLETON, COLONIAL AMERICA: A HISTORY, 1565-1776, 18 (3rd ed. 2002)
(1992).
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, 126 S. Ct. 2862
(2006) (No. 05-1141); Treaty of Middle Plantation (1677), in 4 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN
DOCUMEWrS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 82 (Alden T. Vaughan & W. Sitt Robinson
eds., 1983).
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of difficult questions. One of these questions, however, has never been se-
riously discussed by legal scholars: whether pre-revolutionary treaties be-
tween Native American tribes and the British Empire are enforceable under
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.4 This note seeks to
answer this question using the Mattaponi case as a lens for analysis.
Resolving this issue requires an understanding of various historical
and legal elements. This note begins with discussions of the British colonial
presence in Virginia, the inception of the Treaty of Middle Plantation, and
the procedural history of Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia.5 Having illustrated the historical and procedural contexts of the case,
this note then turns to the intent of the framers to provide the federal gov-
ernment with complete power over Native American affairs and treaty-
making and how this intent should be applied to the Mattaponi case. This
note then presents the international law doctrine of universal succession as a
plausible explanation of how the framers may have understood the United
States' obligations to Native American tribes that had treated with the Brit-
ish.6 Finally, this note will discuss some of the basic elements of federal
Native American law and why their application in the Mattaponi case pro-
duces the most just result for the Mattaponi. In short, this note advocates the
application of the doctrine of universal succession to pre-revolutionary trea-
ties between the British and Native American tribes. This would result in a
presumption of enforceability at the federal level for these treaties, and af-
ford them the protections of the established body of federal Native Ameri-
can law, as opposed to the possibly divergent and unfavorable Native Amer-
ican law developed by the states.
THE COLONiAL EXPERIENCE
The Mattaponi's plight did not begin with Virginia's decision to ab-
rogate their tribal rights in favor of assuring an adequate water supply. In
fact, the issues of tribal rights and sovereignty are rooted in the first encoun-
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari supra note 3. Scholars estimate that, in addition to treaties
executed with other European countries, Native Americans entered into 175 Crown treaties
negotiated by either the British Government or the British colonies. Dorothy Jones, British
Colonial Indian Treaties in 4 HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS 185, 185-94 (Wilcomb
E. Washburn ed., 1988), cited in David Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Discovery: A
Treaty-BasedReappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REv. 277, 292 (1998).
5 126 S. Ct 2862 (2006). The case below was cited as 270 Va. 423; 621 S.E.2d 78.
6 The doctrine of universal succession holds that a new state is bound by the treaty obli-
gations of its parent state upon its independence. See C. Emanuelli, State Succession, Then
and Now, With Special Reference to the Louisiana Purchase (1803) 63 LA. L. REv. 1277,
1280 (comparing and contrasting the doctrine of universal succession and the newer clean-
slate doctrine). The tenets of universal succession will be discussed at length later in the note.
See infra pp. 916-19.
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ters between the Native Americans and the colonial powers of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. Historians estimate that in 1600 approximately
500,000 Native Americans lived east of the Allegheny Mountains and that
some 30,000 of those lived in the lower Chesapeake region. Unfortunately,
by 1677 only five percent of the population of the great Powhatan Confede-
racy of the lower Chesapeake remained, due primarily to exposure to the
European powers, which brought the ravages of disease, depletion of game,
and increased warfare to North America.8 The Mattaponi are descendents of
the tribes that once constituted the Powhatan Confederacy and have settle-
ments along the Mattaponi River.9
The English, in contrast, enjoyed comparative prosperity in Virginia
during the latter part of the seventeenth century with nearly 30,000 inhabi-
tants and enjoying frequent land acquisitions. 10 Despite this significant pop-
ulation growth, Virginia as a society remained developmentally stunted.1
Wars with the Dutch, royal indebtedness, the stirrings of revolution in Brit-
ain, an entrenched colonial government, and an average of four to six times
as many men as women in the colony made for a volatile environment.
t2
What growth the British had sustained resulted from a lasting peace in the
colony since 1646, when the royal governor removed all indigenous inhabi-
tants from the Jamestown Peninsula in an effort to insulate the British from
the native populations.' 3 This period of peace came to a close, however, as
the British expanded beyond the pale of the Jamestown peninsula and once
again made contact with the tribes of the former Powhatan Confederacy.14
By the summer of 1676 rebellion had shattered the tenuous peace.
Nathaniel Bacon, a disenchanted colonist, exploited and fostered the fears
and prejudices of former indentured servants who were finding that the op-
7 MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 28.
8 Id. supra note 2, at 319, 314.
9 The Commonwealth of Virginia "observes a guardian-ward relationship with the Matta-
poni, pursuant to which it established a State reservation... title to which Virginia holds in
trust for the beneficial use and occupancy of the Mattaponi." See 1976-77 Op. Va Att'y Gen.
107, 107-09; 1917-18 Op. Va Att'y Gen. 160, cited in Brief of the State Respondents in
Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Mattaponi Indian Tribe v Virginia 126
S. Ct. 2862 (2006) (No. 05-1141). Although Virginia does recognize the Mattaponi as a
Native American tribe for purposes of state law, it does not accept that the tribe, as it exists,
stands as successors in interest to the Treaty of Middle Plantation. Id. at 4, 14.
10 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM 244-45 (1995)
(1975) (estimating that population on the Northern Neck had grown to 6,000 persons or
approximately 19% of Virginia's total European population).
1 See MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 130-133 (laying out the various setbacks the colony
experienced in the 1660s and 1670s).
12 Id.
13 id. at 133.
14 See id. (discussing the atmosphere leading up to Bacon's Rebellion).
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portunities to acquire fertile land were not as plentiful as they had been told
before leaving England. Bacon drew these poor and discontented colonists
to his side with promises of land-land that he intended to wrench from the
hands of the "barbarous heathen."' 15 Bacon leveled several charges against
the royal governor in a declaration on July 30, 1676, but what is striking
about his complaints against the governor is the focus upon the Native
Americans as being the central problem of colonial Virginia. 16 Bacon ac-
cused Governor Berkeley of maintaining a monopoly on the beaver trade in
favor of the Native Americans rather than the loyal subjects of the crown.17
He further alleged that the governor had "protected, favored, and embol-
dened the Indians against his Majesty's loyal subjects, never contriving,
requiring, or appointing any due or proper means of satisfaction for their
many invasions, robberies, and murders committed upon [the British]."' 8
Bacon's conception of the Native Americans as being the true obstacle to
the success of his followers resulted in violent confrontations between the
various tribes in Virginia and the colonists, affecting even those tribes that
had been friendly towards the British.' 9
Despite initial intensity, Bacon's Rebellion quickly faded after Ba-
con's illness and death in October of 1676.20 Without his charismatic, unify-
ing influence the Rebellion faltered and was followed by several months of
chaos in the colony.2' Unfortunately, despite the relatively short life of the
Rebellion, the British faced a substantial challenge in restoring the tenuous
calm that had preceded the violence.22
15 Declaration of Nathaniel Bacon in the Name of the People of Virginia (July 30, 1676)
reprinted in 3 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY 1783-4 (W.
Keith Kavenagh ed., 1973), cited by MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 136.
16 id.
17 id.
18 id.
19 See MIDDLETON supra note 2, at 137.
20 Id. at 137.
21 Id.
22 Bacon's Rebellion occurred during and aided in a major shift in colonial history. Id. at
138. As of 1660 it had finally become more economically advantageous for planters to tran-
sition from indentured servitude as the primary source of labor in the colony to institutiona-
lized race-based slavery. MORGAN supra note 10, at 299; MIDDLETON supra note 2, at 138-
39. This shift in labor systems resulted from several factors, but what can be definitively
stated is that this transition marked the true emergence of institutionalized racism in the New
World, an emergence which would further complicate relations between the Native Ameri-
cans and the British. See MORGAN supra note 10, at 327-28 (Discussing race prejudice before
and after Bacon's Rebellion, Morgan posits that institutionalized racism may have been
conceived of as a way to prevent poor whites and blacks from uniting against their wealthy
neighbors. Morgan points out that one of the final groups that disbanded was, in fact, a
mixed band of eighty Africans and twenty English servants, a dangerous warning of class,
rather than racial warfare.); see also MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 138 (discussing the scho-
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THE TREATY OF MIDDLE PLANTATION
Having quelled the colonists' revolt, the British quickly began
mending relations with the Native American tribes. The Treaty of Middle
Plantation, executed on behalf of King Charles II with the remaining tribes
of the Powhatan Confederacy, resulted from this attempt to bring order back
to the colonies and restore peace with the Native Americans. Few Native
American settlements remained in colonial Virginia in the aftermath of the
Rebellion, and the few that did remain were weary from years of warfare
with the British and other Native American tribes. The British maintained
that the Treaty would provide the tribes with certain lands and rights similar
to those enjoyed by the colonists.23 The Treaty held that the "Indian Kings
and Queens" would "henceforth acknowledge to have their immediate De-
penency [sic] on, and own [sic] all Subjection to the Great King of Eng-
land. 24 In addition to recognizing the King of England as their overlord, the
Native American signatories of the Treaty were required to convey "Three
Indian Arrows" per year in lieu of quit rent, 25 as well as a tribute of twenty
beaver skins to the governor as evidence of their "Obedience to the Right
Honourable [sic] His Majesties Governour [sic] . . . in acknowledgement
[that] they hold their Crowns and Lands of the Great King of England.,26
The payment of tribute to the King's governor created a guardian-trust rela-
tionship between the tribes of the Powhatan Confederacy and the British
Empire.27 This relationship relieved the tribes of some of the vestiges of
their sovereignty in return for peace and the protection of the more powerful
British Empire. In return for the Native American's promises of fealty, the
British guaranteed them "land sufficient to plant upon." This provision indi-
cates a desire by the English, at least on the face of the Treaty, to deal fairly
with the Native Americans to achieve a lasting peace.
Additionally, the tribes received a guarantee that to preserve peace,
"no English shall Seat or Plant nearer then [sic] three miles of any Indian
Town; and whosoever hath made, or shall make any Incroachment [sic]
upon their Lands, shall be removed from thence, and proceeded against as
larly debate on the significance of Bacon's Rebellion as a transition of Virginia from a fron-
tier society to a slave society).
23 MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 319.
24 Treaty of Middle Plantation, art. 1 (1677), in 4 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCuMENTS:
TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 82 (Alden T. Vaughan & W. Sitt Robinson eds., University
Publications of America, Inc. 1983).
25 Id. at 83, art. II. Quit rent is "[a] payment to a feudal lord by a freeholder or copyholder,
so called because upon payment the tenant goes 'quit and free' (discharged) of all other
services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999) (1891).
26 Id. at 85, art. XVI (emphasis in original).
27 See id. (discussing how the Native Americans hold their crowns and lands at the plea-
sure of King of England).
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by the former Peace made."2 8 While the guarantee of sufficient land to plant
on does not contain any reference to specific lands, this clause provides for
the protection of an identifiable parcel of land surrounding the site of the
traditional tribal village. Furthermore, the members of the confederacy were
also allowed to
enjoy their wonted conveniences of Oystering, Fishing, and gathering Tu-
chahoe, Curtenemons, Wild Oats, Rushes, Puckoone, or any thing else (for
their natural support) not useful to the English, upon the English Divi-
dends; Always provided they first repair to some Publick[sic] Magistrate
of good Repute, and inform him of their number and business, who shall
not refuse them a Certificate upon this or any other Lawful occasion.
29
This passage stands at the center of the modem litigation in the Mattaponi
case because the construction of the reservoir may detrimentally affect the
Tribe's North American shad hatcheries on the banks of the Mattaponi Riv-
er. Destruction of the shad's ecosystem would endanger the Tribe's tradi-
tional method of sustaining itself, thereby raising the question of whether or
not the construction of the reservoir violates the terms and intents of the
Treaty.30 The Treaty further provides that should any of the rights and
promises made to the tribes be breached, or should they suffer any other
injuries at the hands of the English, their first course of action would be to
the governor "who will Inflict such Punishment on the willful Infringers
hereof as the Laws of England or this Countrey [sic] permit, and as if such
hurt or injury had been done to any Englishman."3I This provision provides
the tribe's only recourse in the event of a breach of the Treaty.
Facially this arrangement benefited the Mattaponi immensely. The
Powhatan Confederacy, weakened by years of warfare, disease, and increa-
singly scarce natural resources, likely assented to the Treaty at Middle Plan-
tation to insulate themselves against further British encroachments and pre-
serve what remained of their heritage and traditional way of life.32 Unfortu-
28 Id. at 83, art. IV (emphasis in original).
29 Id. at 84, art. VII (emphasis in original). The shad is a flavorful fish that populates the
tidal waters along the east coast of the United States. It plays a particularly important role in
Virginia politics when, during an election year, candidates, campaign workers, and other
political figures gather in Wakefield, VA for a shad planking, a picnic comparable to a New
England clambake.
30 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 7.
31 Treaty of Middle Plantation, art. V (1677), in 4 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS:
TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607-1789 83-84 (Alden T. Vaughan & W. Sitt Robinson eds., 1983)
(emphasis in original).
32 See MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 319 (discussing the devastating impact British settle-
ment and Bacon's Rebellion had on the tribes of the Powhatan Confederacy); MORGAN,
supra note 11, at 252 (discussing how the Native Americans of Virginia were hardly a threat
to the British presence in Virginia).
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nately, the magnanimous impulses of the British, which are apparent even to
a disinterested eye, remained hardly more than empty words.33 The Treaty
ultimately proved to be little more than a cessation of open hostilities and
many of the Native Americans' rights were effectively.revoked soon after.34
In 1691, the Virginia legislature, in its progression toward the implementa-
tion of institutionalized racism, forbade the intermarriage of Native Ameri-
can and British persons, and by 1705, banned Native Americans from testi-
fying in court. 35 This prohibition of Native American testimony in colonial
courts leaves one wondering whether or not Native Americans could have
even attempted to seek enforcement of the Treaty of Middle Plantation after
1705.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the Native Americans of
Virginia, including the Mattaponi, were a broken people. Their remaining
rights were set to paper, a foreign invention, in English, a foreign language,
and were enforceable only at the pleasure of the Governor, a foreign over-
lord. In effect, the Treaty of Middle Plantation served only to end open hos-
tilities so that the British could continue their project of subjugation.
THE CASE AT BAR:
MA4 TTAPONI INDIAN TRIBE V. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
In 1987, the cities of Newport News and Williamsburg, as well as
York County, commissioned the Regional Raw Water Study Group (Study
Group) to examine the water needs of the Lower Peninsula region of sou-
theastern Virginia.36 The Study Group estimated that the population of the
region would grow by nearly 236,000 people by 2040-a greater than one-
third increase in population-resulting in a projected water deficit for the
three localities of approximately 39.8 million gallons per day.37 As a result,
the Study Group identified thirty-one different options to alleviate this im-
pending problem, but concluded that the best solution would be the imple-
mentation of new water conservation measures and use restrictions, the de-
33 See MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 319 ("The formerly proud peoples of the Powhatan
Confederacy, the Chickahominy, Mattaponi, Pamunkey, Nanesmond, and Paspahegh were
reduced to a handful of families amounting to just five percent of their earlier population. A
treaty [the Treaty of Middle Plantation] signed in the aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion suppo-
sedly guaranteed them certain lands and rights similar to those enjoyed by the colonists. But,
as in Massachusetts, their lands were slowly encroached upon by whites, confining them to a
few small enclaves.")
14 See id.
35 Id.
36 Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia Dept. of Envtl Quality ex rel. State Water
Control Bd., 621 S.E.2d 78, 83 (Va. 2005).
37 Brief of the State Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
supra note 9, at 5, note 7.
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velopment of fresh groundwater sources, and the construction of the King
William Reservoir.38 By 1993 the City of Newport News, acting as the lead
"locality" in the Study Group, filed an application for a permit to build the
proposed reservoir on Cohoke Mill Creek with a "pumpover" from the Mat-
taponi River.39 This pumpover would have the capacity to draw seventy-five
million gallons of water per day from the Mattaponi River and store it in the
new reservoir. The extensive project calls for various pipelines and the im-
poundment of 1,526 acres of land.40 The new reservoir would supply water
to the residents of the cities of Newport News, Hampton, Poquoson, and
Williamsburg, as well as the Counties of James City, King William, New
Kent, and York.4'
Because the reservoir will be constructed by "discharge of dredged
or fill material" into the creek, the municipalities needed a construction
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers.42 That permit,
however, could not be issued unless "a certification from the State in which
the discharge originates or will originate" is provided.43 As a result, the City
of Newport News applied to the State Water Control Board of Virginia for a
Virginia Water Protection Permit.44 The State Water Control Board issued
the permit in 1997 despite evidence that the flooding resulting from the con-
struction of the reservoir would cause substantial environmental damage.45
The proposed project drew fire from various environmental organi-
zations, riparian landowners on the affected rivers and creeks, and the re-
maining members of the Mattaponi Tribe.46 Proving injury as a result of the
issuance of the permit was difficult, however, for several of the larger and
better-organized groups of petitioners, as many of them did not own proper-
ty that would be impacted by the project. As a result, the possibility of a
treaty violation presented one of the strongest arguments challenging the
project.47 Unfortunately for the Mattaponi and the various other citizens
38 Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia Dept. of Envtl. Quality, ex rel. State Water Control
Bd., 601 S.E.2d 667, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
" Id. at 696-697.
40 Brief of the State Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 9, at 5, n. 7.
41 Brief for Appellees at 4, Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia ex rel. State Water
Control Bd., 519 S.E.2d 413 (Va Ct. App. 1999) (Record Nos. 2310-98-1).
42 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), § 404 (2000); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia, ex
rel. State Water Control Bd. 519 S.E.2d 413 (Va Ct. App. 1999).
43 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000).
44 Alliance to Save the Mattaponi,v.Virginia Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 519 S.E.2d at 414-
15.
41 Id. at415.
46 id.
47 id.
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interested in forestalling this project, these treaty claims are nebulous and
resolving them has proved an immensely contentious battle.
The Tribe appealed the decision of the State Water Control Board to
the Circuit Court of Newport News and asserted treaty claims of freedom
from encroachment and protection of their fishing and gathering rights.48
The creation of the pumpover from the Mattaponi River to the proposed
reservoir on Cohoke Mill Creek would draw enough water from the river to
threaten the survival of the North American shad, and thus endanger the
survival of the Tribe's hatchery and traditional fishing practices. 49 Further-
more, the creation of the reservoir would flood lands within the three-mile
radius of the traditional town of the Mattaponi.50
On appeal, the Tribe argued that the Commonwealth is bound by
the terms of the Treaty under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.5' The case reached the Virginia Supreme Court twice.52 On the
first appeal, the court ruled that the Mattaponi Tribe had standing to assert
its claims, as it is a sovereign with justiciable interests that could be injured
by the proposed reservoir project 3 The court remanded the case to the Cir-
cuit Court of Newport News. 54 On remand, the circuit court dismissed the
majority of the Tribe's claims and ruled that the Treaty arose under Virginia
law and not under federal law.5
After the circuit court found that the Treaty arose under Virginia
law, the Mattaponi appealed the issue to the Virginia Court of Appeals.56
The Court of Appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the trea-
ty claims and transferred those claims to the Virginia Supreme Court. 7 The
Tribe once again presented its arguments that Virginia is bound by the Trea-
ty under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and that
the circuit court erred in holding otherwise.58 Nevertheless, the Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's finding, approving Virginia's
argument that as the Treaty was entered into before the ratification of the
Constitution, it could not have been made under the authority of the United
48 Petition for Writ of Certiorari supra note 3, at 7.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Mattaponi Indian Tribe, 541 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 2001); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi,
519 S.E.2d at 415.
53 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 7.
54 id.
55 Mattaponi Indian Tribe, 541 S.E.2d 920.
56 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 7.
57 Mattaponi Indian Tribe, 601 S.E.2d 667, 667 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
58 Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia Dept. Envtl. Quality ex rel. State Water
Control Bd., 621 S.E.2d at 93.
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States. 59 The Virginia Supreme Court further agreed that because the Senate
never ratified the Treaty pursuant to Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitu-
tion, the only law under which the Treaty may be enforceable is Virginia
law. 60 Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court found that, absent a waiver of
sovereign immunity issued by the Virginia General Assembly, the Com-
monwealth is immune from both suits for damages and suits in equity to
restrain or compel governmental action.61 The court then remanded the case
for trial on the merits of the Tribe's treaty claims against the City of New-
port News and the State Water Control Board.62 Regardless of this, the
court's decision regarding the enforceability of the Treaty of Middle Planta-
tion is final to the Mattaponi in all respects, thereby leaving the Tribe to
fight a virtually impossible battle.63
As a result, the Tribe appealed the decision to the United States Su-
preme Court 64 In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Tribe asserted that
the decision contradicts the Constitution's structure of government, the doc-
trine of universal succession, and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.65
Furthermore, the Mattaponi claimed that the decision stood in opposition to
the centuries-old tradition that Native American affairs are matters of feder-
al law.66 Despite significant support for these arguments, the Supreme Court
denied the petition and the case has since proceeded against the City of
Newport News and the State Water Control Board, but has not yet been
concluded.67
The arguments in support of the Mattaponi's position are intriguing,
and upon closer evaluation present a reasonable basis for finding that pre-
revolutionary treaties with Native American tribes are, in fact, enforceable
under the Supremacy Clause. To make this argument, however, discussion
must begin with the emergence of the United States from the British Em-
pire.
5 Id. at 94.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 96.
62 Id. at 98.
63 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 11.
64 Id.
65 See generally, id. (presenting arguments in favor of issuing a writ of certiorari).
66 Id. at 17.
67 Mattaponi Indian Tribe, 126 S. Ct. at 2862. Since this paper was written the Tribe's
treaty claims Newport News and the State Water Control Board have survived motions of
demurrer and summary judgment. Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia, 72 Va. Cir. 444 (trial
order) (2007).
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THE DAWN OF A REPUBLIC: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
Despite significant disadvantages, several Native American tribes
managed to manipulate the colonial powers' rival interests expertly during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.68 The Iroquois, for example, were
especially adept at manipulating French, Dutch, and English interests to
secure for themselves significant power, despite their comparative weak-
nesses in technology and population. 69 For example, at the onset of the Sev-
en Years War the Iroquois indicated favoritism for the French, but ultimate-
ly aligned with the British in exchange for the promise that no British sub-
jects would be permitted to settle on Iroquois lands and hunting grounds
west of the eastern mountains.70 With Iroquois support, the British won the
Seven Years War and effectively ejected France from North America, and
the Iroquois then stood in a stronger political position vis-A-vis the British.71
The British realized, particularly after the Seven Years War, that the
most effective way to manage Native American affairs was under the cen-
tral authority of the Crown rather than through the various local colonial
governments.72 Warfare and general chaos between the colonists and the
Native Americans necessitated this centralization of power over Native
American affairs.73 The Crown issued a Royal Proclamation on October 7,
1763 that recalled all settlers from Native American lands and forbade any
future emigration until further notice was issued.74 The proclamation also
mandated that only licensed government agents could trade with the Native
Americans. 75 Most importantly, however, the Crown retained full and ex-
clusive authority to make treaties with the Native Americans.76 This stands
as an example of the emerging tradition in the New World of centralized
control over Native American affairs. This trend, although questionably
supported by the Articles of Confederation, would find new life with the
adoption of the Constitution.
68 MIDDLETON, supra note 2, at 330.
69 Id.
70 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 58 (5th ed.
2005).
71 Id.
72 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 17.
73 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 17. See, e.g., Royal Proclamation, Oct. 7,
1763, reprinted in COLONIES TO NATION 1763-1786: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 16-18 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1975).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Wilkins, supra note 4, at 291-92 ("[T]reaties negotiated between Britain and the
British colonies with Indian tribes.. generally centered on the establishment of peace and
friendship, alliance, trade, return of captives or exchange of hostages, boundary establish-
ment or revision, or land cessions.").
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With the onset of the Revolution and the establishment of the Unit-
ed States under the Articles of Confederation, Native Americans were faced
with a new entity that threatened to deprive them of their power to manipu-
late and foster the inherent jealousies among the colonial powers. During
the Revolution many Native American tribes aligned with the British, and
achieving peace with these tribes proved challenging for the fledging gov-
ernment.17 The Iroquois in the North and the Cherokees, Creeks, and Chick-
asaw in the South were particularly troublesome to the newly independent
colonies, necessitating action by the fledgling government. 78 The Continen-
tal Congress responded in 1775 by creating three departments for Indian
affairs, each focused on a different geographical region.79 The importance of
improving relations with the Native American tribes at this time is clearly
evidenced by the brain trust of commissioners assigned to the middle de-
partment, including Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry, and James Wilson.8 °
These commissioners were empowered to treat with the Native Americans
"in the name and on behalf of the united colonies. 81
When the Continental Congress took up the Indian question in
drafting the Articles of Confederation in 1776, they disagreed over the
scope and authority of the central government over Indian affairs. Many
states were concerned about centralized control over Indian affairs, fearing
that it would constitute a limit on the State's ability to govern effectively.
Virginia was particularly concerned over the control of the tributary tribes
within its borders-including the Mattaponi-and wanted some guarantee
that it would be able to manage its own Native American affairs.83 Other
delegates disagreed with Virginia's position. James Wilson of Pennsylvania
argued in Congress that "[w]e have no rights over the Indians, whether
within or without the real or pretended limits of any Colony. They will not
allow themselves to be classed according to the bounds of Colonies., 84 Wil-
son recognized that the most effective way of dealing with these quasi-
sovereign peoples would be with a uniform policy invoked by the central
government. The compromise reached and laid down in the Articles of Con-
77 See FRANCIS PAUL PURCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL
ANOMALY 24-27 (1994).
78 Id. at 26.
79 Id. at 27, citing 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 175 (Wor-
thington C. Ford ed., 1904-37).
80 Id.
81 id.
82 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 21 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005).
83 id.
84 6 J. CONTINENTAL. CONG. 1077 (1776), quoted in COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 82, at 21.
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federation was, in the words of James Madison, "obscure and contradicto-
ry. 85 The relevant Article holds that
[t]he United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and ex-
clusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians, not members of any of the States provided that the legis-
lative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated.
86
This provision in the Articles illustrates the disagreement among members
of the Continental Congress over the resolution of the Indian question. In
form, it divides the right to manage Native American affairs between the
states and the central government. In doing so, however, the clause fails to
delineate what constitutes membership in a state and which legislative rights
are protected.87 In effect, this provision created more confusion over Native
American affairs than it resolved. As a result, the Mattaponi continued to
pay tribute to the new American governors of Virginia, and Virginia thus
became the successor in interest to Britain's treaty with the Mattaponi.
88
Virginia Attorney General Troy issued an official opinion on the Treaty of
Middle Plantation in 1977 stating that:
To interpret the rights in land confirmed by the treaty [of Middle Planta-
tion], one must examine the rights in real property then recognized by
Great Britain, the prior sovereignty which governed the land in Virginia. It
has been the policy of the United States to respect these previously recog-
nized rights, based upon principles of international law.89
As a result, Virginia argues today that the Treaty of Middle Plantation, if
enforceable, is so only under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia and not at the federal level.
The Mattaponi interpret the Articles more narrowly, however, than
some scholars have. In their filing for a writ of certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court, they claim that "the drafters of the Articles of Confe-
deration also sought to prevent conflict with Indians by vesting Congress
with the exclusive power to "'enter[] into treaties and alliances' and to 're-
gulat[e] the trade and manag[e] all affairs with the Indians."' 90 The Matta-
poni ignore this admittedly cryptic clause preserving any of the State's leg-
islative rights with regards to Native American affairs and instead focus on
a holding from the Second Circuit concluding "that [the Articles of Confe-
85 THE FEDERALISTNo. 42, at 306 (James Madison) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961).
86 U.S. ART. OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX (1777).
87 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 82, at 21.
88 1976-77 Va. Op. Atty. Gen. 107.
89 Id.
90 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra at note 3, at 18.
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deration] did not give the states any power to make treaties of war and
peace with the Indians." 91
The confusion over the boundaries of state and federal power under
the Articles appeared to be resolved, however, with the adoption of the new
Constitution in 1789, which removed all references to state power in Native
American affairs.92 As a result, the Mattaponi countered Virginia's argu-
ment that the Treaty of Middle Plantation is enforceable only under Virginia
law with the proposition that the adoption of the Constitution, with its new
treatment of Native Americans, implies that the new federal government
took up the obligations of the British under the treaty as the successor to all
British claims and obligations in the former colonies.
93
THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIVE AMERICAN AFFAIRS
The adoption of the Constitution in 1789 fundamentally trans-
formed the ways in which relations with Native American tribes were admi-
nistered.94 Although several states maintained treaties executed on their own
behalf with tribes within their borders from before the ratification of the
Constitution, the new governing system left all future actions concerning the
Native American tribes within the purview of the federal government.
95
There was hardly any debate on the "Indian question" during the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787.96 Nonetheless, the lack of debate has been inter-
preted to indicate "a sign of agreement within the convention that Indian
affairs should be left in the hands of the federal government.,
97
The first reference to the "Indian question" resolved the issue of
whether Native American tribes are subjects of the states they inhabit.98 The
91 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra at note 3, at 18, citing Oneida Indian Nation of
New York v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988).
92 Id. at 22.
9' Id. at 12-14.
94 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 83, at 25. ("Madison's
intent to end state encroachments on federal authority, and contemporary state interference
with federal Indian policy, all contribute to the understanding of the Indian commerce clause
as a broad grant of power to the federal government and a limit on state power to interfere
with federal Indian policy.").
95 Id. James Madison remarked that "[bly the Federal Articles, transactions with the In-
dians appertain to Congress, yet in several instances the States have entered into treaties and
wars with [Native American tribes]." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
316 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). In this particular case, Madison was referring to Georgia.
FRANCIS PAUL PURCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLMCAL
ANOMALY 68, n. 1 (1994). Additionally, New York had treated with the Six Nations of the
Iroquois during this period. Id. at 38.
96 Id. at 68.
97 Id.
98 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 82, at 25.
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resolution came in James Wilson's proposal that the count of state residents
for purposes of determining representation and the apportionment of direct
taxes not include "Indians not paying taxes in each State." 99 The ultimate
language in the Constitution became "Indians not taxed,"' 00 and was ac-
cepted without debate, indicating the general acceptance that Native Ameri-
can tribes carried a special status in the United States.' 0 '
The new Constitution embodied the idea that the federal govern-
ment would wield substantial, if not complete, control over Native Ameri-
can affairs in what is commonly referred to as the Indian Commerce
Clause. 10 2 This clause holds that "Congress shall have Power To ... regu-
late Commerce... with the Indian Tribes."'' 0 3 The prior drafts of this clause
began with the exceptionally broad power "[t]o regulate affairs with the
Indians as well within as without the limits of the United States."' 1 4 This
was limited by the Committee on Detail, which added to the clause granting
Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States" the words "and with Indians, within the Limits of any
State, not subject to the laws thereof."'1 5 This amendment to the Commerce
Clause was subsequently reduced to just "and with the Indian tribes."'10 6
This curtailment of the proposed amendment indicates a desire of the dele-
gates to provide very broad power to the federal government over Native
American affairs; the wording was accepted without debate.'0 7 Thus, the
general impetus to read the Commerce Clause broadly in favor of federal
involvement, coupled with the fact that Indian tribes are enumerated as a
specific group that the federal government has special commerce power
over, effectively relieves the states of any obligation or right to manage the
affairs of Indian tribes within their borders.1
0 8
99 Id.
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
101 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 82, at 24.
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
103 Id.
104 Federal Convention Journal Entry (Aug. 18, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 321 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). See PuRCHA, supra note 77, at
68.
105 Federal Convention Journal Entry (Aug. 22, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 367 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). See PURCHA, supra note 77, at
68-69.
106 Federal Convention Journal Entry (Sept. 4, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 493,497 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). See PuRCHA, supra note 77,
at 69.
107 Id. at 495, 499. PURCHA, supra note 77, at 69.
108 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 82, at 25.
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The proposition that management of Native American affairs is
firmly within the purview of the federal government enjoys support from
various sources. For example, many interactions, at least until 1871,'09 be-
tween the United States and its resident Native American tribes had been
governed by treaties, which are only within the power of the federal gov-
ernment to create and ratify." 0 This indicates that the generations of politi-
cians following ratification of the Constitution understood Native American
affairs to be properly dealt with similarly to international affairs, a preserve
of federal power."' James Madison, a leading drafter of the Constitution,
pointed to problems arising from a lack of centralization with regard to trea-
ty-making under the Articles, while debating the adoption of the Constitu-
tion in 1787:
Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to such
encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as
well [as] in every other confederated republic ancient and Modem. By the
federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs. Yet in
several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them.
In like manner no two or more States can form among themselves any
treaties &c. without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga. & Maryd. in one in-
stance-Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without
previous application or subsequent apology."l
2
In this commentary, Madison illustrated the problems that arose under the
Articles in allowing States to negotiate treaties with Native Americans and
other states.
President Washington embraced the view that the federal govern-
ment exercised complete control over Native American affairs in his expla-
nation of the importance of the Indian Commerce Clause to Corn Planter,
Chief of the Senecas, who was concerned about state purchases of Indian
lands." 3 Washington declared, "the Case is now entirely altered. The Gen-
eral Government only has the Power to treat with the Indian Nations ... No
State, nor Person, can purchase your Lands, unless at a general Treaty, held
under the Authority of the United States."' '14 Washington's assurances indi-
109 Id. at 26. Congress outlawed the making of treaties with Native American tribes in
1871. See Act ofMar. 3, 1871 §1, 16 Stat. 544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71).
'10 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
"1 Id.
112 DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, in JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, KEPT BY JAMES MADISON (E.H. Scott ed., 1893) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION]..
113 CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 70, at 62.
114 Id. Subsequent Supreme Court cases have held, however, that lands purchased by the
States prior to the adoption of the Constitution are immune from the Indian Commerce
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cate a change in the way Native American affairs would be handled in the
United States, particularly regarding land rights. Furthermore, his state-
ments show that he understood the Constitution to provide the federal gov-
ernment ultimate authority over Native American affairs.
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE VERSUS THE TREATIES CLAUSE
Several clauses in the United States Constitution address treaties
under the new form of government. Article VI establishes the legal extent of
the Constitution."' It also resolves the status of all debts and engagements
incurred and entered into before the adoption of the Constitution. 16 In short,
this article adopts all of the treaty obligations that the nation was subject to
under the Articles of Confederation, but it does not speak of treaties the
United States may have succeeded to. Article VI continues on proclaiming
that:
The Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution
or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.1
17
The Mattaponi invoke the Supremacy Clause, claiming that all treaties are
the "supreme law of the land," and thus Virginia may not decree that the
Commonwealth enjoys sovereign immunity from the provisions of the Trea-
ty of Middle Plantation. 1
8
Admittedly, this argument faces some serious challenges, the most
notable of which is the Treaties Clause, which holds that the President
"shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."' 9 Until
the 1870s, the negotiation and ratification of treaties with Native American
tribes by the federal government was a common method of dealing with
issues arising between the tribes and the people of the United States. 2 '
Virginia rests its argument that the Treaty of Middle Plantation does
not fall within the purview of the Supremacy Clause on the assertions that
the Mattaponi are not a "federally recognized" Native American Tribe and
Clause. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that
Articles of Confederation permitted New York to purchase Indian lands).115 U.S. CONST. art VI, el. 1.
116 Id.
117 U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
118 Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia 270 Va. 423, 450-51 (2005).
119 U.S. CONST. art. 11, §2, cl. 2.
120 See supra note 109.
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that the Senate never ratified the Treaty.121 Virginia's arguments are flawed,
however. First, there is case law supporting the proposition that treaty rights
of tribes that are not recognized by the federal government may be en-
forced,22 including rights of tribes that had enjoyed recognition and have
since lost it.' 23 Second, there is a viable argument that as the framers in-
tended the newly organized federal government to have complete control
over Native American affairs, then they also intended pre-existing treaties
with Native American tribes to become binding as the "supreme law of the
land," as the treaties executed under the Articles had been. 124 Finally, re-
turning to the issue of federal recognition, such recognition or lack of rec-
ognition would be rendered irrelevant if the Treaty enjoys status as being
the "supreme law of the land." This is because federal recognition is a pre-
requisite that has developed since both the creation of the Treaty of Middle
Plantation and the United States' succession to the British interest in that
Treaty. Thus, requiring federal recognition of the Mattaponi for the Treaty
of Middle Plantation to be enforceable does not make sense because formal
federal recognition was not a prerequisite to the formation of treaties at the
time when the United States would have acceded to the Treaty of Middle
Plantation.
Regardless of these arguments, Virginia maintains that the Treaty is
enforceable only under Virginia law, and that the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity prevents even that. Accepting such an argument would
do a great injustice to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and serve
only to distort and devalue the Supremacy Clause.1 25 In United States v.
Pink, the Supreme Court held that "state law must yield when it is inconsis-
tent with or impairs the policy or provisions of a treaty or of an international
compact or agreement.' '126 This holding was explicitly extended to treaties
made with Native American tribes in Antoine v. Washington, which held
that a state statute that conflicted with rights guaranteed by a Native Ameri-
can Treaty was unenforceable with regard to those rights because it con-
flicted with the Supremacy Clause. 127 Antoine placed treaties with Native
121 Brief of the State Respondents, supra note 9, at 3.
122 See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
the Stillaguamish Tribe has vested rights under Treaty of Point Elliott even though the Tribe
is not officially recognized by the federal government).
123 Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
124 See "Theories of State Succession," infra pp. 916-19. This section contends that the
founders would have understood preexisting treaties with Native American tribes within the
colonies to have still been in effect as a result of the application of the universal theory of
state succession to treaties.
125 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 15.
126 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
127 Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 205 (1975).
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Americans on the same level as those entered into with foreign states as
being "the supreme law of the land.,
128
The Mattaponi argue that allowing the common law of sovereign
immunity to trump the Treaty of Middle Plantation would leave the treaty
with less force than a common contract. 129 The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts holds that "ordinarily, when a court concludes that there has been
a breach of contract, it enforces the broken promise by protecting the expec-
tation that the injured party had when he made the contract."' 30 Under Vir-
ginia's argument of sovereign immunity, however, the Mattaponi are denied
even this protection of their expectations. Virginia carries the contract anal-
ysis of the Treaty further, arguing that the Mattaponi's claims should be
barred under the doctrine of laches, as they have never-as far as Virginia
knows-attempted to enforce any of the provisions of the Treaty previous-
ly.131 This argument is fanciful, at best. In the first place, if the doctrine of
laches did apply here, it would seem hardly fair to impose it on the Matta-
poni, especially since Native Americans were prohibited from testifying in
court in colonial Virginia. 132 Furthermore, the Mattaponi contend that this
result-the Treaty amounting to less than a contract-is in direct opposition
to Puyallup Tribe v. Dep 't of Game, which held that construing a "treaty as
giving the Indians 'no rights but such as they would have without the treaty'
would be 'an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention which
seemed to promise more, and give the word of the Nation for more."",
133
Although this holding rests upon the assumption that the treaty in question
is, in fact, enforceable, the requisite enforceability may be found outside the
plain meaning of the Supremacy Clause in the theory of universal succes-
sion to treaties.
THEORIES OF STATE SUCCESSION
The numerous variations in the creation and destruction of states
have resulted in two basic approaches to state succession to treaties.1 34 The
128 Id.
129 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 15.
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 15 citing Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 344.
131 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 19. Furthermore, the
Mattaponi have continued to pay tribute to the governor of Virginia, as required by the Trea-
ty of Middle Plantation, to the Present day. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at
5; Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari supra note 9, at 23.
132 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
113 391 U.S. 392, 397 (1968) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Petition for Writ of Certi-
orarim, supra note 3, at 15-16.).
134 See Emanuelli, supra note 6, at 1279. See also D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE
SUCCESSION 6-9 (H.C. Gutteridge et al. eds., 1956).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
universal succession doctrine emerged during the formative years of inter-
national law and was inspired by concepts of Roman law discovered during
the Renaissance. 135 Under this doctrine, emerging states acceded to the trea-
ty obligations of their parent states. 136 During the nineteenth century, how-
ever, scholars began advocating the application of the clean slate doctrine,
under which a new state begins life in the international community free
from the obligations of its predecessor state. 137 This theory embraced the
voluntarist theories of international law that abounded during the nineteenth
century.138 Regardless of this clear historical progression of state succession
theory, both of these theories have been applied at various times throughout
history. 39 Virginia uses this inconsistency in application to argue that the
applicable doctrine of state succession in any case depends upon the context
of the emergence of the new state.
These inconsistencies need not, however, be a matter of concern for
the Supreme Court in the Mattaponi case. When the United States emerged
at the end of the eighteenth-century, the "clean slate" approach had not yet
entered the arena of international politics.140 As a result, there was no debate
concerning whether to adopt the clean slate or the universal model. Interes-
tingly, in the case of the Louisiana Purchase, the Treaty of 1803 provided
explicit provisions governing the succession to treaties concluded by Spain
with the Native Americans.' 41 This raises the question of whether the si-
lence of the Treaty of Paris on similar issues may be interpreted as a desire
by the fledgling United States to escape the obligations of the British vis-A-
vis the Native Americans within the United States. Such a position may
seem logical to the modern reader, as the Vienna Convention of the Succes-
135 Emanuelli, supra note 6, at 1280.
136 Id. at 1279.
131 Id. at 1280.
138 Id. at 1280. See Mathew C. R. Craven, The Problem of State Succession and the Identity
of States Under International Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 142, 147-48 (1998).
139 Einanuelli, supra note 6, at 1282. For example, the following states followed the prin-
ciple of universal succession when they went their separate ways: the break-ups of the Great-
er Columbian Union in 1929, of Norway and Sweden in 1905, of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire in 1918, the USSR in 1991 and continuation by Russia, of Yugoslavia in 1991-92, of
Czechoslovakia in 1993, and the independence of the British dominions referred to by the
Statute of Westminster in 1931. Id. Meanwhile, the "clean slate" doctrine was invoked dur-
ing the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands in 1831, the succession of Finland from
the USSR from 1917-1920, the separation of Poland and Czechoslovakia from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1918, the Independence of Ireland from 1921-1949, the succession of
Pakistan from India in 1947, the creation of Israel from 1947-1949, the succession of Ban-
gladesh from Pakistan in 1971, absorption of the German Democratic Republic by the Feder-
al Republic of Germany in 1990, the independence of the Baltic States in 1991, and the
emergence of several newly independent states through decolonization. Id at 1283.
'40 See Emanuelli, supra note 6, at 1280. See also Craven, supra note 138.
141 See Emanuelli, supra note 6, at 1284.
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sion of States in respect of Treaties, which entered into force in 1996, holds
that "newly independent states" do not inherit treaty obligations concluded
on their behalf by their predecessors. 142
Although the clean slate doctrine is now embraced by many nations
of the world, including the United States, it would be patently unfair to ap-
ply it in the matter at hand. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 84,
invoked Grotius' theory that "states neither lose any of their rights, nor are
discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their
civil government.' 43 Grotius' theory may be applied to the Mattaponi case
in two ways. First, it supports the proposition that all treaties executed be-
fore American independence remain binding on the United States, regard-
less of whether or not they have been sanctioned by Congress. Second, it
may be construed to support the argument that Virginia's refusal to waive
its sovereign immunity is irrelevant. This is because when Virginia, as part
of the confederation of colonies, seceded from Great Britain it remained
fully bound by the provisions of the Treaty of Middle Plantation as a new
sovereign state under the principles of universal succession. As a result, no
subsequent enactment of its legislature may justify the abrogation of any
provision of the treaty, as it had been fully acceded to as a byproduct of
independence.
Virginia argues that allowing universal succession to apply could
open a "Pandora's box of claims against the National Government and the
States."' 44 This argument fails to take into account the body of federal Na-
tive American law that has allowed for the abrogation of certain treaty terms
by the federal government. 45 Thus, while there may be a number of new
claims that may be filed under the principle that pre-revolutionary treaties
are enforceable, there remains a means whereby the federal government
may control its obligations under those treaties. Virginia also expresses con-
cern over the question of how such a finding may affect the United States'
position internationally. 146 The United States is a signatory of the Vienna
Convention of the Succession of States in respect of Treaties, which en-
dorses the clean slate doctrine. The Senate has never ratified the Conven-
tion, but it is followed by the State Department. Thus, application of the
doctrine of universal succession may be construed, as the Commonwealth
attempts to do, as conflicting with the State Department's adherence to the
Convention.
142 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 16, Aug. 23,
1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3.
143 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 440 (Bucaneer
Books, 1992). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 14.
144 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 20.
145 See infra note 179.
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 20.
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Nonetheless, Virginia's concerns over the effect of the Court's
sanctioning of the universal theory of succession are overwrought. First, the
State Department's sanctioning of the clean slate doctrine does not render it
the official policy of the federal government. Second, as the Senate has nev-
er ratified the Vienna Convention there is no binding authority requiring the
United States to favor one theory over the other. Third, it would be uncons-
cionable to use the clean slate doctrine in evaluating treaty claims that arose
before the doctrine had been conceived of. 147 Fourth, it seems likely that the
international community would understand the Court's reluctance in sanc-
tioning such a retroactive measure and forgive the momentary break with
accepted policy in a very specific and narrow class of situations. Virginia's
argument against the application of the doctrine of universal succession
rests upon an ill-defined and unsubstantiated fear of "constitutional chaos,"
and as such provides practically no basis for the Court to reject the doctrine
of universal succession as the Mattaponi wish to see it applied in this
case. 148
In light of the fact that the universal succession doctrine was the on-
ly theory on the enforceability of a parent state's treaty obligations on a
newly independent state in the late eighteenth century, it is possible that the
framers accepted the proposition that the Treaty of Middle Plantation is
enforceable under the Supremacy Clause. Under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the individual states retained great power over Native American affairs
and even freely meddled in international affairs despite limitations on their
powers to do SO. 149 Thus, Virginia's argument that it stood as successor in
interest to the British with regard to the Treaty of Middle Plantation was by
the principle of universal succession to treaties under the Articles of Confe-
deration.
The situation changed dramatically, however, with the adoption of
the Constitution. Here a new question emerged: Did the adoption of the
Constitution constitute an event whereby the federal government became
successor in interest to Virginia's obligations regarding Native American
affairs? One may look to the writings and debates of the founders on Native
American and international affairs for the answer. 150 James Madison cer-
tainly opposed the individual States' ability to meddle in Native American
affairs. 151 Additionally, the founders determined that treaty-making was
147 Such a practice would do a disservice to the original signatories of the treaty and their
progeny, as they would not have known that their treaty-protected interests were endangered
by a newly emerging theory of state succession.
148 See PURCHA, supra note 77, at 68.
149 See note 96.
150 See supra pp. 910-13.
151 See DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 112, at 190.
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solely within in the power of the federal government. 152 As a result, the
Treaty of Middle Plantation ought to be considered binding on the level of
government responsible for the management of Native American and inter-
national affairs. Furthermore, although the Treaty of Middle Plantation has
never been ratified by the Senate, it has been regarded as enforceable by
Virginia for centuries and should now enjoy the presumption of supremacy
as a result of its historic treatment as a binding treaty. 53 Accepting that the
Treaty is enforceable under the Constitution renders irrelevant the issue of
whether or not Virginia has waived its sovereign immunity, as the Mattapo-
ni's treaty interests would be a matter of federal rather than state law.
The Supreme Court provided support for the theory of universal
succession early on, and thereby the conclusion that the Mattaponi's treaty
interests are a matter of federal law, holding that "[t]he United States suc-
ceeded to all the claims of Great Britain, both territorial and political...
,,154 Included in these claims would be claims of Great Britain that were
garnered and protected through treaties with the various Native American
tribes. The protection of British, and now American, claims by universal
succession of treaties would logically flow both ways. In other words,
where the rights of the British transferred to the new American state so did,
presumably, their attendant duties. The Court later reiterated this holding
stating that "[c]olonies were planted by Great Britain, and the United States,
by virtue of the revolution and the treaty of peace, succeeded to the extent
therein provided to all the claims of that government, both political and ter-
ritorial." '55
Thus the Treaty of Middle Plantation is, in fact, enforceable under
the doctrine of universal succession, which is supported by the evidence of
the historical record and the writings of the Supreme Court. There remains
the question, however, of what the Mattaponi gain by achieving federal rec-
ognition of their Treaty.
FEDERAL NATIVE AMERICAN LAW
Even if the Supreme Court were to find the Treaty of Middle Plan-
tation enforceable under the Supremacy Clause, the Mattaponi may still be
unable to achieve their ultimate objective of protecting the Mattaponi River
from the reservoir project. federal recognition of the Treaty would rescue it
only from the capricious acts of Virginia, but leave it exposed to the legisla-
tive whims of Congress. Regardless, the Mattaponi enjoy a significant ad-
vantage at the federal level in the substantial body of Native American law
152 U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2.
153 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 4, n. 4.
1 - Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 544 (1832).
155 Holden v. Joy 84 U.S. 211, 244 (1872).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
that has been forged over the decades by the Supreme Court. This section
focuses upon some of the basic tenets of federal Native American law and
illustrates the invaluable purpose it serves in providing a standard policy for
dealing with Native American affairs.
The Mattaponi claim that "obligations imposed by Indian treaties
should be enforced as matters of federal law to ensure their uniform, consis-
tent, and predictable interpretation. ' ' 156 Allowing the Virginia Supreme
Court to decree that the Treaty of Middle Plantation arises only under state
law would allow the lower courts of Virginia to develop their own line of
Native American law, which may largely ignore the precedents of the Su-
preme Court, adopt them, or result in a wholly divergent interpretation. 157
Such a doctrinal ambiguity may result in the development of conflicting
standards of interpretation, thereby resulting in complex litigation and the
potential for the abrogation of rights that had traditionally been presumed to
be safeguarded by the Supremacy Clause and the principles of universal
succession to treaties. 
158
The genesis of federal Native American law can be found in the
early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. In Johnson v. McIntosh, Chief
Justice Marshall faced the difficult question that would serve as the founda-
tion for all subsequent Native American law: who held original title to the
lands of North America?' 59 Although the Native Americans were the first
occupants of the land, Marshall held that their right of occupancy did not
carry with it title to the land.' 60 Marshall looked to the Age of Discovery
and took hold of the principle adopted by the colonial powers "that discov-
ery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it
was made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession."' 6' This principle not only validated the Euro-
pean powers' colonial missions, but also provided a means to carry out their
colonial endeavors while avoiding squabbles over lands amongst them-
selves. The Court respected the Natives' longtime presence in North Ameri-
ca in a limited context, however:
156 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 16.
157 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 16-17. Cf Seneca Nation of Indians v.
New York, 382 F.3d 245, 261 n. 17 (2d Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed 6 U.S.L.W. 22
(U.S. Feb. 3, 2006) (No. 05-905) (noting that "although [the federal Indian canons of con-
struction] were articulated specifically with reference to treaties and other legislative enact-
ments by the United States goverment... we see no reason not to apply a similar standard
to Indian treaties negotiated by Great Britain, a prior sovereign").
158 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 11.
159 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
'60 Id. at 562.
161 Id. at 573.
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They were admitted to be rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their
own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the funda-
mental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it.
16 2
Thus, the Supreme Court crafted a sort of compromise that granted all rights
of land title to the imperial powers and then to the United States as succes-
sor in interest to the British, while providing some protection for Native
American tribes through a right of occupancy. This compromise avoided
two extremes, one where the Native American tribes held exclusive title,
regardless of discovery, based upon their prior occupancy, and one where
the Native Americans held no rights whatsoever with regard to the land as a
result of conquest. 163 This decision serves as a basis for American property
law and clearly established the Court's tradition of looking to protect the
interests of Native Americans while maintaining the ultimate authority of
the United States. 164
McIntosh did not mark the full extent of Chief Justice Marshall's
impact on federal Native American law. Later, in Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, the Chief Justice addressed the question of whether the tribe constituted
a "foreign State[]" within the meaning of Article III, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution. 65 This highly politicized case prompted Marshall to refuse to
reach the merits of the tribe's application by holding that the Cherokee Na-
tion was not a foreign state for jurisdictional purposes. 166 This decision, that
the Cherokee Nation did not constitute a "domestic dependant nation," was
not a complete defeat for the tribe, however.' 67 Marshall wrote, in a manner
reminiscent of his splitting the baby approach in Marbury v. Madison,
168
that the tribe, while not a foreign nation, does retain an "unquestioned right
to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a volunta-
ry cession to our government.' ' 169 Marshall continued on to hold that the
Cherokee Nation and other Native American tribes "may, more correctly,
162 Id. at 574.
163 CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 70, at 68.
'64 Id. at 68.
165 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); U.S. CONST. art. I1, §2, cl. 1; See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK 1 (Hardy Myers & Clay Smith eds., 3d ed. 2004).
166 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 165, at 1.
167 See id. at 2.
168 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1802) (holding that the Court did not have the requisite jurisdic-
tion to hear Marbury's claim, but legitimized the concept ofjudicial review).
169 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2.
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perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a terri-
tory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take
effect at point of possession when their right of possession ceases.9 170 Jus-
tice Marshall's explanation of the meaning of being a "domestic dependent
nation" rested upon the perception that Native American tribes are
in a state of pupilage. Their relation the to the United States resembles that
of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and
address the President as their great father. They and their country are con-
sidered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely
under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt
to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would
be considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostili-
ty.171
The Cherokee Nation decision illustrates the special position that Native
American tribes occupy in the United States, a position between that of be-
ing subjects or citizens, that of domestic foreign nationals. 172 The Court,
speaking once again through John Marshall, subsequently stated a trilogy of
principles in Cherokee Nation's companion case, Worcester v. Georgia,173
that have since been applied as federal common law and serve as part of the
foundation of federal Native American law. 174
Worcester did not first articulate the Marshall Trilogy, as some au-
thorities have termed them, but it did rely upon them as a basic foundation
of federal Native American law. 175 First, by virtue of their status as the first
possessors of the land, Native American tribes retain a certain amount of
preexisting sovereignty. 176 Second, this sovereignty is subject to diminution
or elimination by the United States but not by the individual states. 177 Third,
a trust relationship exists between the United States and Native American
tribes arising out of the tribes' limited inherent sovereignty and their corres-
ponding dependency upon the United States for protection. 78 These basic
principles have been the subject of extensive discussion by both the Su-
preme Court and students of federal Native American law, but regardless of
the various glosses that have been applied, the principles remain as they
170 Id. at 17.
' Id. at 17-18.
172 INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 165, at 2.
17' 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
174 INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 165, at 5.
175 id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
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were articulated in 1832. 79 Application of these principles to the Mattaponi
case would provide the Tribe with a certain amount of protection arising out
of the trust responsibility, but would also allow Congress to abrogate the
Tribe's treaty-protected rights should it so desire. Regardless of this possi-
bility, federal recognition of the Mattaponi's treaty claim would allow for
application of the Indian law canons of construction for treaty interpretation,
which may provide some limit to Congress' ability to abrogate provisions of
the Treaty.
The canons of construction did not emerge fully developed but in-
stead developed from ideas articulated in early Native American law cases,
such as Cherokee Nation and Worcester.180 The Court did articulate the ba-
sic premises of the canons in Jones v. Meehan, holding that:
In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it
must always ... be borne in mind that the negotiations for the treaty are
conducted, on the part of the United States, an enlightened and powerful
nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written lan-
guage, understanding the modes and forms of creating the various technic-
al estates known to their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by
themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them and in their own language;
that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, who
have no written language and are wholly unfamiliar with all forms of legal
expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is
framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United
States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed . . . in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.
181
Thus, under the canons of construction, treaties are to be liberally construed
in favor of the Native Americans. 82 Furthermore, these treaties are to be
interpreted "not according to the technical meaning of [their] words to
learned lawyers" but according to how the Native Americans would have
originally understood them. 83 Although the canons have expanded and con-
tracted over the years depending on the specific contexts of the cases in
which they were invoked, they still remain as the foundational principles for
treaty interpretation in Native American law.1
8 4
179 See id.
180 See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
181 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
182 COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 83, at 119.
183 Jones, 175 U.S. at 11; COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 83, at
119.
184 See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 83, at 122-28 (discussing
the various challenges and modifications of the canons in specific instances). See, e.g., Min-
nesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (applying the canons of
construction to find that an 1855 treaty did not abrogate the Tribe's usufructuary rights).
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The Marshall trilogy and the Native American law canons of con-
struction provide the foundation for all federal Native American law and
jurisprudence. As a result, tribes from across the nation may rely upon one
cohesive body of law for ensuring that the remnants of their special semi-
sovereign status are protected. In denying the Mattaponi's claim that their
Treaty is enforceable as a matter of federal law, the Supreme Court has ef-
fectively denied the Tribe the protections of over two centuries of law that
have developed upon the basic premise that matters arising out of Native
American treaties are federal matters. This decision will leave the states to
develop their own rival bodies of law' 8 5 in cases where Native American
tribes fail to prove that their treaties were assumed by the federal govern-
ment under Article VI of the Constitution.18 6 The Mattaponi have attempted
to abide by the terms of their treaty, continuing to this day to pay tribute to
the governor of Virginia. 8 7 Yet, as a result of a war and peace they had no
control over, and despite over two hundred years of conducting their affairs
with Virginia as though the treaty had the force of law, the Mattaponi are
faced with the strong likelihood that their former rights will fall to the prac-
tical necessities of providing water for a burgeoning population in southern
Virginia. With their pleas falling on deaf ears before the Supreme Court it
seems that the only viable option remaining for them is to call upon Con-
gress to take action on their behalf. The Tribe has attempted to obtain feder-
al recognition in the past, but to no avail.18 8 Yet, with their judicial options
quickly evaporating and the gross inequities they face becoming increasing-
ly apparent, perhaps Congress may finally take notice of the battle for sur-
vival that the Mattaponi have waged for over a decade.
CONCLUSION
The Mattaponi face various challenges in their efforts to save the
Mattaponi River. Regardless of whether the Supreme Court finds the treaty
to be enforceable, the Water Control Board may still issue the Water Protec-
tion Permit, because the Board is not required to consider treaty obligations
in deciding whether to issue a permit.1 9 Furthermore, Virginia offers argu-
ments that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by Native American tribes
against the states. 190 Virginia also raises the question of whether the Matta-
185 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 16-17.
186 CONST. art VI, Cl. 1.
187 Robin Farmer, Holiday Troubling to Va. Indians, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 23,
2006, at B 1.
188 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 5.
189 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 18.
190 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991) (holding that the
sovereign immunity confirmed by the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by Native American
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poni can prove that they are successors in interest to the original signatories
of the Treaty.' 91 Finally, Virginia also contends that the Supreme Court can
not hear the matter because a final judgment or decree had not been issued
by the Virginia Supreme Court, as the case was remanded to the trial
court.192 Although these issues all present potential pitfalls to the Mattaponi
case, the Tribe's central claim-the ultimate enforceability of the Treaty of
Middle Plantation under the Supremacy Clause-enjoys support in the do-
cumentary record and the doctrine of universal succession. Moreover, the
principles of federal Native American law support a reading of the treaty
that protects the Mattaponi's rights to their reservation lands and fishing
rights on the Mattaponi River, regardless of Virginia's laches arguments.
Native American tribes in the United States have suffered a linger-
ing defeat. Beginning with the arrival of British colonists in Virginia in the
late sixteenth century and continuing until the modem day, Native Ameri-
cans, their tribes, and their cultures, have withered from their once vibrant
presence in North America to a point where they are desperate not to be
entirely engulfed by the broader American culture. The Mattaponi are a
small tribe, remnants of a great Native American confederacy. Fewer than
one hundred members live on their reservation trying to eke out an exis-
tence while maintaining what they can of their culture, including fishing for
the North American shad on the banks of the river that bears their name.
93
The Study Group originally developed thirty-one different options for solv-
ing Virginia's water needs; perhaps there is an alternative to the destruction
of a portion of the traditional Mattaponi reservation.194 Regardless of the
alternatives, however, the founders intended that all treaties formed under
the Articles of Confederation remain in full force, and that intent, coupled
with the theory of universal succession to treaties, stands in support of the
proposition that pre-revolutionary treaties executed between Native Ameri-
can tribes and the colonial powers are binding under the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. Thus, when, as will likely occur, the Mat-
taponi's cases against Newport News and the State Water Control Board
reach the United States Supreme Court, the Court should issue a writ of
certiorari and ultimately hold that pre-revolutionary treaties with Native
Americans enjoy the status of being the "supreme law of the land" as a re-
sult of the application of the doctrine of the universal succession to treaties
executed before independence.
Tribe against the States) as cited in Brief of the State Respondents in Opposition to the Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 16-17.
191 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 15.
192 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 19.
193 Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 4.
194 See note 49.

